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*NOTES ON THE NEW EDITION OF GOODWIN'S
GREEK MOODS AND TENSES.*

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I.

These notes will be devoted to strictures. Dispraise is not the guerdon of the work; but strictures form an integral part of criticism, important in proportion to the importance of their subject. This edition greatly enhances the reputation of its precursors, and its merits are sure of the amplest commendation; still, it has not even yet outgrown a certain fundamental narrowness and irrational reserve, with certain errors and inconsistencies of application.

This is not an age of syntax; the history and comparison of forms and sounds are the gods of our scholars; meaning and interpretation beyond what may be incidentally assumed from rudimentary reminiscence, have few worshippers. The expressed opinions, the actual instruction, the published work of our professors and teachers; the programmes of electives and graduate-courses in our leading colleges; the lists of papers read before The American Philological Association—about one in seven being syntactical; the conceptions and valuations of the several aspects of classical study acquired even by honor-men in our universities—hardly one in a hundred of whom appears to have heard whether there be any syntax beyond the school-manuals; the blunders from which “comparative grammar” has not saved some of our very few aspirants in syntax; the ease with which crudity and superfluity find a place in our journals—all these go to show that “fondness for syntax” is not a characteristic of American scholarship. If “fondness for syntax” were, as it ought to be, a characteristic of American scholarship, we should not have a maker of books teaching contradictory doctrine in companion-volumes, elaborated prolixity of detail in demonstration of ancient doctrine; if “linguistic science” found amongst us its true complement in “fondness for syntax,” we should not have absurdities removed and retained at the same time by a simple change from text to foot-note; we should not have waited so long for this new edition, and Gildersleeve would long ago have had his deserved preëminence.

As it is, since the facts of syntax cannot be understood or imparted without some theory of syntax, the helpless teacher or writer is forced to ignoble confession or to brazen artifice, while the shower of applause that greets the rare author's last revision is the very same that exhausted its vocabulary of panegyric over the views he has since abandoned as false. If Allen and Greenough's Latin Grammar had not suffered from overpraise and mispraise at the hands of those who of themselves ought to have seen, and who by position ought to have exhibited, its obvious and self-perpetuating weaknesses, not even its publishers could have made its success so great; and the fact that the book, in the hands of a safe teacher, is really so available is only a stronger reason why it should be relieved of peril to the unsafe and inexperienced. At an interval, very much the same may be said of Goodwin's Syntax.

II.

This revision is notable, chiefly because of its author's conversion; like Saul, he has seen a great light, and he preaches it. Till now severely practical, he has grown through practice to theory, and he joins the band of these prophets. True, he is not a full-fledged philosopher; that he will never be; his philosophy is not a natural, but an acquired, taste; but the changed mind and heart atone for all negligences and ignorances. That Professor Goodwin, whose fame is indissolubly connected with the conditional sentence, should, for so many years, have considered his indebtedness to Gildersleeve adequately settled by the forgotten foot-note in *The Transactions*, is now less a marvel than that he should ever have allowed himself to be and to remain in such sympathy with, and under such obligations to, a man of such different mould. Amidst the labored indifference, not to say the studied disapprobation, with which New England and the East have viewed Gildersleeve's work, this declaration of Professor Goodwin's is like the eruption of an unsuspected volcano. Those who fully estimate what his acknowledgment implies may pay Gildersleeve the tribute of quoting his imperfect as the "tense of disappointment," and say "*Hic aderas!*"

III.

Professor Goodwin is the highest type of New England scholar, and the general justice of his domestic and foreign reputation is cheerfully conceded everywhere. But the chief merit of the mind

he typifies is simplicity, its chief result is availability, qualities no way incompatible with lack of depth in interpretative insight. Complete classification is not a characteristic of the mind he represents; the leading characteristic of that mind is pursuit of the practical, which often mistakes clearness for truth; and the practical man too often proves himself inferior to the theorist by having his work to do over. To such a mind, given a genus naturally falling into five species, the New England grammarian will probably see and note only three; and, in his examples, he will give two instances of each of two species, and omit illustration of the third; or he will word his principle so that no one of his examples necessarily applies.

Professor Goodwin's books have been justly praised in England; but it must be remembered that the English are particularly deficient in grammatical sense; and the tribute of one of their great weekly reviews to the second edition of *The Moods & Tenses* as virtually a "treatise on logic and the science of language" must have seemed premature even to the flattered author. Simplification no more implies profundity than common-sense implies learning or the power to teach; in fact, simplification is obstructed by the very fulness of knowledge and by the breadth of a total view, and it can often be obtained only by the discounting or even the subversion of the truth. This is why the greatest scholars cannot make the most available books; their presentation, in satisfying themselves, becomes inaccessible to those for whom it is intended, and is overlooked by those who would profit by it. In point is Gildersleeve's Latin Grammar—the best, and almost the only original, work on Latin Syntax in English, but the most impracticable for the age usually concerned with grammar.

IV.

Professor Gildersleeve, the high-water-mark of American scholarship, is the very opposite of Professor Goodwin. To learning as great, he adds a magic versatility of cognizance and apprehension and sympathy almost unparalleled; the acutest feeling for grammatical subtleties, the most infallible power of interpretation, and the most felicitous gift of expression; a vital touch with all phases of modern life, and a delicate or a playful familiarity with ancient men and times; which combine to render him a unique figure in contemporary scholarship. And yet he has not enjoyed the recognition and the homage due to such a position. How far this aloofness is due to his personal and professional attitudes may be a question;

but, a certain *succès d'estime* left out, the fact remains that, in the country at large, he has been for the most part ignored and mistrusted. To a just mind, this is marvellous, but not more marvellous than that none of Gildersleeve's favored and favorite pupils seem to have caught his spirit and been called to missionary service in the cause of his ideals; not more marvellous than that the very journal to which Goodwin is so profusely indebted should, for ten years, have found it hard to live for the men who will now, of course, admire his revised views. When Professor Goodwin transcends the circle that has sometimes to some of us seemed a mutual admiration society, if not an organized propaganda, to glory in studying pages that so many boast of leaving uncut, in learning from a man whom his neighbors under their breath call fantastic, while they fear him so wholesomely, I deem it a worthy date for the new hegira from the bugaboos of the practical and the scientific; and his willingness to confess so much in behalf of his only possible rival—a rival, too, likely to be advanced greatly in general repute by his endorsement—is a fitting text for the new dispensation.

V.

To discuss in detail all the exceptions that may fairly be taken to this revision would far exceed any space and time at my command. I purpose to consider at relative length the general criticisms I make, and then indicate briefly such individual cases as they include.

Professor Goodwin discloses his unsymmetrical way of looking at things in the very beginning: he does not define verb, and proceed to explain how interrogative and imperative forms really assert; and he does define mood, resting satisfied in traditional vagueness; and, coming to tense, he defines that idea with no new felicity. The individual moods he does not define; on the contrary he merely catalogues a number of unequally significant uses, wherein no historical claims can atone for the logical obscuration. Though it does not appear from the new preface, he is evidently still under the domination of the scientific scare, whose demands for accuracy he recognizes to an extent beyond his power to meet. But it is not lack of accuracy, lack of comprehensiveness, lack of brevity, that he seems to have in mind; the only warning that can fairly be drawn from the "numerous unsuccessful attempts" is the difficulty of making definition self-explanatory, which, however, is no absolute condition of definition; if it were, science could not live or move; and Semper's

colossal definition of the "conditions of existence" ought to be consolation enough for any definer who is not reconciled to his lot by the summary disposal of heat as "a mode of motion." If physical science, with its advantages of concreteness, objectivity, mechanism, and symbols, has even occasionally to rest in such definitions, I think students of disembodied function need not fear her criticisms on their formulae. Till science establishes all her claims and claims only what she has established—till she becomes logical enough to remember that her special processes were logic's before they were appropriated by science, and to make her votaries conform to logic, whether they become scientific or not, fear of her demurrers is altogether gratuitous. It is entirely possible to characterize moods according to all the conditions of definition, if types are viewed out of the confusions of secondary association, as it is to differentiate rainbow-colors out of their blending. The pure indicative is the actual; the pure second mood (subjunctive, optative, conditional, potential, etc.) is the potential; but the actual is itself potential of that which, under the law of universal dualism, it is always becoming, and the potential is actual so far as it is an existent and operating principle; and so we find the two forms secondarily changing places, especially under the tendency to view indirectly (i. e. potentially) what is really an assertion of the actual. This explains the modal use of the indicative, both in the continuative and in the indefinite tenses, involving the transition of tense to mood, so extensively illustrated in Hebrew. And the logical classification of uses not only does not contradict the historical, but is the only one that stimulates rationally the processes of mind, while the latter may assert nothing beyond mechanical occurrence. This classification does not imply that "moods were deliberately invented to express certain definite classes of ideas to the exclusion of all others, and then always held rigidly to these predetermined uses; on the contrary, their various uses grew up gradually, as language was developed and found new ideas to express"; but, while the developed series of functions in a mood is not necessarily deduced, each term from one immediately preceding in time, no mood, however its various meanings seem to cross each other's tracks in chronological advance and retreat, ever acquires any use irreconcilable with its origin. Thus the indicative is the generic mood, retaining and sometimes asserting those potential uses of which the other moods are merely specialized functions, more or less capable of reverting to the original value. Finally, as long as our minds work by logical association and not by temporal

connections, the correlation of uses will prove more available than their chronological tabulation; and so long as science fails to free herself from the other limits of her jurisdiction, the moods of man may fairly claim to be outside of her power to symbolize mathematically and to define mechanically.

VI.

Especially interesting is the substitute for the long since superannuated appendix on the subjunctive and optative; the present view is the one that I have held for some fifteen years; the one that I urged on Professor Goodwin in the revision of his grammar. There is certainly no way to determine that the subjunctive originally expresses only futurity, since futurity and contingency are inseparable reciprocals; but all the infallibility of all the Germans is not sufficient to deduce the uses of subjunctive and optative from such secondary ideas as *will*, *wish*. The neutral value is unquestionably original, and adapts itself to either mental attitude, the cognitive (declarative) or the volitive (imperative). "Potential" is better used as a differential of form than of mental attitude, so that the subjunctive and optative are potential declaratives or potential imperatives; and the infinitive as a predicate may be regarded as an actual or a potential assertion or "imperation." Again, the particle $\alpha\upsilon$, which has assumed and retained certain conventional positions, is never primary or necessary, but always only a secondary explication of implicit meaning—a view which clears up many difficulties as to its presence or absence in unexpected places. (See §§ 162, 3, 4, 329, 506, 681, 489, 592: cf. *possum* expressed or omitted after vbs. trial—*si*.)

VII.

There is the old sophistication as to the change from indicative to optative in oratio obliqua. The optative to the indicative is a difference in kind, which is overcome by the conditional (potential) element of oratio obliqua; but the optative to subjunctive is only a difference in degree of the same (potential) kind. The optative to the imperative is a difference in kind, being paralleled by an indicative assertion of the actual to an optative with $\alpha\upsilon$ assertion of a potential, which may differ only as direct and indirect views of the same phenomena.

VIII.

The ordinary aorist now begins to get its dues, but the new learning has not clarified the definition of the gnomic aorist, which the author still ascribes to "animated language," as if the proverb and the oracle were not "sententious" or anything except "animated." And, in explaining, he forgets his definition of aorist and uses the very details he has excluded. The gnomic aorist has nothing to do with "one distinct case or with several distinct cases;" it simply gives the yea or nay of the record, one case being as good as, and no better than, a thousand. "Care killed a cat" has no suggestion of distinct cases; it is only the voice of the record as to the actuality of occurrence. But, when it accepts the fact as sufficiently established by one case, it is far from denying that many have happened; else the iterative aorist with $\alpha\upsilon$ would be impossible.

It is especially important in Greek to antithesize the aorist and the perfect, and I do not think Professor Goodwin has satisfactorily done so. The phenomena referred to by both are the same, necessarily past; the aorist simply so refers to them, the perfect asserts their present value in the form of permanent result or established reputation or abiding experience, without implying substantial or mechanical or concrete result. "I have built a house" does not necessarily imply present possession of the house; nor does "he has killed his man" imply present possession of the cadaver; but each assert the possession of the reputation established and the experience acquired. But, as the aorist does not express, so it does not deny, the resulting condition; any more than the aorist denies the continuative or repeated character of the act which it, instead of the imperfect, represents; and thus the exigencies of metre, or even mere variety, may veer between aorists and imperfects or aorists and perfects in reversible combinations.

IX.

The chapter on the uses of the moods, in spite of some shifting, retains its old haphazard arrangement. If there is method in language, there ought to be some method in its presentation. Here Professor Goodwin has not learned from Gildersleeve, or he would never have tumbled simple and complex, direct and indirect, sentences into one chapter, putting asunder sentences that the logic of mind has joined together, and confounding all grades of hypo-

tactic integration. Conditional sentences the extremes of reciprocal subordination, are thrown in midway, with no connection before or after, absolutely cut off from the potential expressions from which they are developed; and the same may be said of relative sentences, except in their relation to the conditional. *Oratio obliqua*, which is not part of any coördinated sentence—classification, is plunged into the midst of unlikes; and *causals* and *wishes* come in as an anti-climax.

X.

I pass now to some details. In § 259, "the distinction of tense has no reference to the moods" is at least misleading in view of the cogent discrimination of M. W. Humphreys in *Trans. Am. Phil. Ass'n* for 1876, which I take to be conclusive.

After the analysis of §§ 261 sqq., which is a memorable substitute for the old desideration of *purpose* as an element in fearing-clauses (cf. old ed. § 43 C.)—being an attempt to fit a genus into one of its species—the reversal in the order of topics in § 303 is surprising. (cf. XII below, on § 926.)

In § 306, the explanation of $\mu\eta$ — $\mu\eta$ for $\mu\eta$ — $\text{o}\upsilon$ as due to the desire to avoid repetition, is hardly adequate in a language that repeats negatives so freely as the Greek. More likely, $\text{o}\upsilon$ is the negative of idea (notion), $\mu\eta$ of form; at long interval, the dues of the form unconsciously assert themselves; and no doubt $\mu\eta$ $\text{o}\upsilon$ is always to be expected.

In §§ 312, 313, difficulties are removed by bearing in mind that, whatever the conjunctive form of introduction, even when there is none, every subjunctive or optative is generically conditional (potential); hence $\text{o}\acute{\varsigma}$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is conditional as well as final, and the clauses after *verbs of trial* (§§ 486, 487) are final as well as conditional. Both sets are *causal*, *purpose* being *final cause* and *condition* the *theory of cause*; and both are *relative*, as being the dependent members of correlated combinations. Again they are both *indirect questions*, *purpose* being action taken to *answer the question* whether there is power to actualize a potential. The presence or absence of $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is explained by its merely explicative character, just as the expression of a verb of fearing with a $\mu\eta$ clause is a mere explication. There is in fact no such thing as a final particle; the finality grows out of the relation, as all the values afterwards expressed by special conjunctions originate without conjunctions; and the same particle

explicates various relations, as the same relation may explicate itself by many lines of conjunctive development (cf. *expecto si, ut, dum*. See further below.)

From what has been said, it does not seem that the Greeks were really aware of so many distinctions of contingency as are noted in §§ 235, 399—the forms with *ἄν* being mere explications of the others, as is the possible intent of the somewhat inconsistent footnote (1), page 144.

In conditions, the ultimate difference between indicative and subjunctive-optative is this: the indicative, not being itself conditional, acquires its conditional value only by relation; while in subjunctive-optative, which are per se conditional, this value is inherent and independent of the conjunction which explicates the relation. In other words, every general principle being conditional of its special applications, an indicative condition is to a subjunctive-optative condition as “a drowning man catches at straws” = “if a man drowns, he catches at straws,” is to “a drowning man would catch at straws” = “if a man should drown, he would catch at straws;” or as *volo* to *velim*. That is, the indicative may express the theory of condition by forms based upon and limited to a special time; the subjunctive-optative, by using future time, implies besides futurity the abstract relation outside of actual time; and it is emphasizing this merely relational and theoretic character of the combination that suggests remoteness of prospective realization for the optative and reflects upon the subjunctive the secondary idea of nearness or vividness; just as the indicative becomes the mood of fact in mere offset to the subjunctive-optative as the moods of conception. Perhaps it is this affinity of the future and the conditional notion that vindicates the use of subjunctive-optative in protases of general conditions, which are doubly conditional through the expressed relation and the general principle, and hence prefer to explicate modally.

In §§ 486, 487, the explanation is a crude substitute, not clearly grasped and not consistently followed, for a rough-and-ready predecessor; consequently, it is not conclusive. The apodosis after verbs of trial *is* expressed; it is the principal verb; and there is no ellipsis. There is no such thing anywhere as the kind of ellipsis Professor Goodwin imagined in the earlier editions, the attempt to supply which is simply to chase an infinite series of final causes. Nor is there any complexity of protasis and apodosis, except as every sub-

junctive-optative is an apodosis and implies a protasis; and the examples here are not like those protases that become indirect questions only by becoming object-clauses to a verb requiring such complement, as *ibo visam si domist*. Roby (§ 1754) states the misconception at length; and even Gildersleeve nods,* though of course his filling of the ellipsis would be far different from Goodwin's. There is no ellipsis in these examples, because there is no way to attach the assumed apodosis; etymologically and logically, the clause need not be or be considered a technical condition, as the same conjunction explicates different relations and the same relation is explicated by different conjunctions, and relation depends ultimately for interpretation not on vague pronominal conjunctions or even on mood but on the circumstances of the case; and finally the conditional conjunction is at any rate only secondarily conditional, while these clauses are as old as the language. But, if we must consider the protasis as technically conditional, it is only as every subjunctive-optative is essentially conditional, as is the final clause, in whose case the conditional value has already been exhibited, and in temporal clauses and elsewhere. Condition is the theory of cause; purpose is final cause, that is the theory tested; the test (apodosis) is actual, the theory (protasis) conditional and potential; in other words, purpose is an action undertaken under the hypothesis that by it a certain result is possible (cf. § 612.) *Venio si videam, venio ut videam*, differ, if at all, only in the roads appropriated by later specialization, and not in the ultimate relation, which in the mood remains the same; the former explicates the essential hypothesis in *si*, implying "in the hope that" as a justification for the action taken, and suggesting that action as the effort to solve a problem of possibility; the latter, keeping the hypothesis, may be held to regard it as an apodosis expressing the possible manner of the main verb, to which *si veniam* might be appended as a protasis. In fact, it is possible to consider *venio si videam* as a double condition, equal to *venio si videam si veniam*; (cf. § 510); and, if there must be ellipsis, this is the only rational form of it. Professor Goodwin altogether misses the point of conditions like *ᾤκτειρον εἰ ἀλώσονται* (§ 495), in which *ἀλώσονται* does not mean "were to be captured" (§ 697); *ᾤκτειρον* involves (Gil. L. G., § 603) *ἔλεγον οἰκτερεῖν* (cf. Madv. L. G., § 369). Mood and tense alike show that these are not causal in the sense that *Θαυμάζω εἰ* is causal. The principle is § 490, where however

*And yet, is it the nod of Zeus? (Il. A, 526, 527.)

the two indicative protases need at least a reference—though they do not seem to be covered by any single section. The element of *wish* ascribed to some of the protases here included may be either *for* or *against*. (Cf. Gil. L. G., § 598, and Wordsworth's "O mercy! If Lucy should be dead!", and Hebrew condition=prohibition, Students' Heb. Gr., p. 330. Goodwin continues to ignore *wish against*.) In point is § 612, though there Goodwin makes the conditional value secondary, losing the ultimate signification of the relations.

From what has been said, the exclusion of *ἐάν* from interrogatives is invalid and impracticable. Such protases as occur in § 491, like all others under similar circumstances, become indirect questions according to their relation to the leading verb; if that verb implies question or answer, oral, mental, actional, and there is no other object for its complement, the originally antecedent protasis furnishes to the transitive verb the expected object or subject, as being the most or only available supply of that demand of mind; just as, the predicate being given—as in an impersonal verb—the next element afforded is regarded as the subject under the requirements of mental procedure. *Εἰ* may introduce subjunctive-questions, as it may introduce subjunctive-conditions (§ 454); the *ἐάν* questions with subjunctive are chiefly the purpose-conditions already explained; the difference between the conjunctions and the relations they imply is not important enough to be distinguished with the optative or in Latin. Similarly, § 304 is over-discriminating.

XI.

§§ 611 sqq.—621 sqq. The treatment of particles signifying *until* and *before* is, on the whole, greatly improved, though § 553 ought to be included; and references to *dum redeo* (Verg. Ec. IX. 23)=*while* I am returning=*till* I return; to Abbott (§ 184) for *to=till, till=to*, prep. or conj.; to Earle, Phil. Eng. Tongue, for modern provincial *while=till*, are in point. As the author does not make *conditionality* a fundamental differential, it is not easy to see his object in relating these temporals to conditional sentences instead of to finals—especially as his explanation of "protases after verbs of trial" cannot be accepted. Nor is the difference in mood with words=*until* after past and future forms respectively clearly explained by showing how what was an aim has become an inde-

pendent fact; and there is no reason why § 614 should be degraded to finer print.

§ § 621 sqq. The theory of these constructions could have been clarified by a correlation of (1) negation of priority, (2) priority of negation, (3) continuance of negation, (4) negation of continuance; (1) (2) are interchangeable, but not so (3) (4); (1) (2) must be *οὐ πρίν*; (3) may be *οὐ πρίν*, *οὐχ ἔως*; (4) must be *οὐχ ἔως*; *πρίν* can=*until* after affirmatives only when the affirmative is continuative. Verbs of *ceasing*=(3) or (4). More stress needs to be laid on divergence of Latin or Greek for *priority*=*prevention* of action merely conceived, hindered (§ 626; cf. *Madv. Gk. Synt.* § 167).

XII.

§ 662. We have the same definition of *oratio obliqua*—one which is either circular or meaningless. “Conform to the construction of the sentence in which they are quoted” is either untrue or truistic; it either means that an indirect quotation is one that takes the construction proper to indirect quotation—which may be true and must be useless; or it implies a kind and a degree of conformity which do not exist. Indirect discourse has for its only distinctive feature the readjustment and reduction of an old assertion to new relations, primarily, pronominal, secondarily, modal or temporal; but this readjustment and this reduction have not, even in one language, a single invariable form, they have no form that is not a part of other constructions. No change of form is essential, no subordination by conjunction or mood is indispensable; in fact, a subordinating conjunction may even accompany the direct quotation (§ 711.) The definition is a part of “general grammar;” and here, as well as in the case of mood, as the mind must classify, the teacher or writer must exempt the immature pupil from a necessity he cannot ignore. Gildersleeve (§651), in avoiding mechanical reduction, becomes too vague. § 684 is not satisfactory. (Cf. § 136 and *Am. J. Ph.* IV., 428.) The difference between “comp. inf.” and “acc. with inf.” is simply in degree of integration, whereby one act becomes a mere preliminary part of another. The infinitive (as a verb) must always have a subject in thought (§ 744); but, when the actions are integrated, the identical subject of both verbs acts at once for both. (A. & G. have confused the matter, § 271.) It is not “the meaning of the leading verb,” but closeness and continuity of thought, that

debars a subject expressed from the dependent verb ; an expressed subject would be gratuitous and intrusive.

My chief comment on the Infinitive and Participles concerns the sections on their theory, where I find a lack of clear and profound thinking and several Bunsbian opinions, in spite of considerable improvement of a practical character. To discuss the various words and phrases that illustrate this general comment would require more time and space than I can afford ; but I suggest, as a sign, a comparison with Gildersleeve's way of interpreting the article in the articular infinitive (cf. his Just. Mart. A, 3, 9 : 10, 16). § 786 ought to refer to §§ 438, 736 ; and § 803 to § 623. In § 850, the Latin example is not in point, as *se absente* belongs to *tentari*, and the expression "difference in meaning" seems to have no meaning at all (cf. Madv. 428, 1). In § 867, we have a telling contrast to § 109, N. 9 of the old edition and to § 277 N. 3 of revised Grammar of 1879 (cf. Gil. Just. Mart. A, 4, 19). In § 926, the statement seems to imply surprise that *δεῖ* does not take a dative agent—a misplaced and misleading implication. (Cf. X above, on old ed. § 43, C.)

XIII.

Omitting some fundamentals from lack of space, I close with a brief gleaning on sundry heads.

§ 22. In some uses, English shows relative tenses more freely than Greek, as in all future conditionals or quasi-conditionals.

§ 25. The modal value of present and impf. (as Th. 1, 28, 4, 5, *εἶων, ἀπάγωσι*; 53, 3, *λύετε*; Verg. Ec. 4, 3 *canimus*) is not adequately brought out. Cf. § 490.

§§ 27, 49. Pres. and pf. are reciprocals ; the completion of one act=the continuance of a state or of another act ; hence the power of reduction is noway "peculiar" (cf. §§ 32, 51.) After what was said above on the relations of pf. and aor., there is nothing surprising about § 61. § 60 is paralleled by colloquial "*did* you know?" = "do you know?" and by the mother's "*did* it want a lump of sugar, then?"

§ 75 is another example of explication. I have not seen attention called to the future participle used as coincident with its leading verb ; cf. Isoc. Paneg. § 185, *ἔσεσθαι ἐδεήσοντας*; also Eng. "I should have liked to have seen," "He is a man who I should not think would do such a thing," "He wants that I should go." (Cf. §§ 41, 113, 211, 428, b.)

§ 76. The persistence of this verb in indic., where subj.-opt. would be expected, ought to be noted (cf. § 553, where add to examples, Xen. Hell. II., 2, 16; II., 3, 4, 7; also §§ 591, 592.)

§ 127. The future element is involved in the leading verb: cf. Eng., "He said *to learn* the next page" = "He told us to learn." Goodwin's use of such expression as "*offending aorists*" (§ 127), "*fluid language*" (§ 239), "*venerable Canon Davesianus*" (§ 364), "*borderland between past and future*" (§ 448), are very significant of his growth.

§§ 144, 146 end, leave us in doubt how this participle combines with the *perfect*. I am inclined to believe that, when the matter is fully worked out, it will be found that the identical time-reference in the participle here is no more and no less than the coincidence of § 150. For § 150, a reference to some papers in Trans. Am. Phil. Ass'n is in point. (Cf. above on § 75.)

§§ 165 sqq. and 322. These state the groove or rut in which the Greek language ordinarily moves; but, abstractly, there is no more objection to the optative here than to its use in a condition based on and dated from the present, as is its normal use (cf. Hayman, Od., App. I., 15; also M. T. § 252 R. 2, § 409.)

§ 172 points the Latin contrast (cf. Gil. L. G. § 517 R. 2; § 598, R. 1, 2.)

In §§ 176, 558 sqq., assimilation is considered merely formal, as in § 239; it is really the recognition that the dependency of a potential is *a fortiori* potential (cf. also § 334.)

§ 220 is an extension of 219; ἄν is attracted to the verbs of modified assertion.

In § 244 end, the example Od. IV., 544 again suggests the unreal fut. perf., above referred to; cf. Verg. Aen. VI., 879, and Liv. XXII., 60, 15 (peregissem.)

§ 249, in the last member of the first sentence, lays a burden on somebody who ought to believe the rest of us.

§ 254 needs more distinct reference to impv. as a virtual protasis of condition.

§ 369. The confusion is explained in the same general manner as εἰ, εἰάν interrogative above: μή=interrogative only for the *fear* which involves the wish to remove it by settling negatively the question whose uncertainty produces it. The rendering of the first example in point is cumbrous for "we shall not doubt through fear"

(=we shall know.) So § 371=to think with fear; § 373=to refuse through fear; § 376=to doubt through fear.

§ 368. I confess myself unable to see the practical importance, either of the suspense or of the discovery. The conditional relation is inherent in the reciprocal attitude of the elements involved, and is not a secondary result of some other relation distinctly expressed by a specialized conjunction; all subordinate conjunctions are relatives, or deputy-relatives (as *πρίν, ἐστὲ*); but, as such, they are indeterminate to vagueness, and offer no specific suggestion of direction in development: this must still be sought for in the original relation of the elements (cf. uses of *ὥς, ut*, and the clause after *expecto*.)

§ 410. It ought to be noted that unreal apodoses, while in the same general present or past time as their protases, may be relatively future to them. In "If I had the money, I would pay you," the protasis belongs to the specific moment of speaking; the apodosis does not.

§ 412. I may be permitted to refer to a forthcoming paper of Mr. M. A. Bayfield's and my answer thereto in the *Classical Review*.

§ 467, like § 155, § 534, is certainly a misconception. The generality is directly expressed in the indicative tense; else § 24 errs.

§ 511. I do not remember seeing attention directed to the illustration of the same general principle in the negation of two propositions in relation, either of which may be true alone; cf. Dem. de Cor., § 179 (the famous climax), Cic. Mil. XXXI., *neque—motu*. Similarly, as an affirmative combination of the same nature, Psalms XV., 4, "He that sweareth to his own heart, and changeth not."

§ 513 is an unworthy thirty-year survivor. "Now" and "then," in the logical sense, are conjunctions; adverbs become conjunctions by acquiring a sentence-relation. "Now Barabbas was a robber" illustrates the conjunction *now*; in conditions, *then*, always implied as the apodotic introductory, is the conjunctive sign of reciprocal subordination. Professor Goodwin will find in Webster and in Maetzner *then* as a conjunction; it goes back to Anglo-Saxon.

In §§ 565 sqq., 575 sqq., there is still some confusion due to the relations of *purpose* and *result*, which are not adequately treated.

§ 736. At last we have, though only as an alternative, the true explanation of *μη* by analogy; the wonder is we have had to wait so long for so little.

P. S.—Since these notes were written, I have read the only professed review that I have seen—the *Nation's*. It is a pity all reviews are not signed, that we might

estimate the views by the writer or the writer by his views. No doubt there is a certain strength added to a writer by his absorption into the impersonality of a reputable journal; no doubt there is a certain repute added to a journal by its absorption of the personality of a strong writer. However these things be, it is worth the while of anybody to acquire a masterly conception of one writer and his works just as a touchstone for the critics and criticisms of those he has to read by report. Nobody who tries the experiment can fail to conclude that, little as is the wisdom with which the world is governed, it is the very quintessence of sagacity as compared with that which is most often manifested by the reviewer. The *Nation's* review is a fair type of the foreordained favorable, constrained by traditional propriety to work off a few commonplaces by way of reservation. It is conventional in the beginning, random in the end, inadequate everywhere. It notes the changes from the first edition without any misgiving that at least some of these, depending not on new discoveries but on old reflection, ought to have been made years ago,—in fact should never have been needed. The reviewer credits his author with powers he has never shown, and he quotes from the preface without comprehending its most significant acknowledgments. He desiderates certain doctrines, without seeing that the details he mistrusts grow out of just the principles and the general point of view he commends; and he never suspects the delicate irony of complimenting a writer for a certain point of view when that writer confesses his deepest indebtedness, and illustrates it even more emphatically than he records it, to the very apostle of the opposite point of view. His exercise of the reviewer's inalienable right is very tame and somewhat forced; he does seem to have the current confidence in justification by faith in statistics, not remembering what the eunuch said to Philip; but he has not found all the misprints.

